Operation of the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act by Thomas, John R.
OPERATION- OF THE OHIO POST-CONVICTION
REMEDY ACT
Collateral attack on convictions by the use of a post-conviction
statute is a recent development in Ohio. Judges, prosecutors and
defense attorneys are encountering many problems in effectuating
the statute which can be solved only by considering the entire con-
cept of post-conviction on both a procedural and a substantive level.1
The Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act - was originally enacted
in July, 1965, and substantially modified in December of 1967. The
statute is an attempt to meet the possible federal requirement for
a state procedure to hear federal constitutional claims. This re-
quirement was suggested by the United States Supreme Court in
two main cases, Young v. Ragen3 and Case v. Nebraska.4 In Young
the Court stated that the federal habeas corpus requirement of
exhaustion of state remedies presupposed that an adequate state
remedy existed.5 The Court granted certiorari in Case "to decide
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the States afford
state prisoners some adequate corrective process for the hearing and
determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional guaran-
tees." 6 After certiorari was granted but before the case was decided
the Nebraska Legislature enacted a post-conviction statute.7 The
Court felt that on its face the statute was an adequate corrective
process.
The stated purposes of the Ohio act,9 nearly identical to the
1 Symposium on Post-Conviction Remedies: Foreword and Afterword, 27 Omno
ST. L.J. 237 (1966).
2 Omo REv. CODE. ANN. § 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1967).
3 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
4 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
5 Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1948).
6 Case v. Nebraska, 381 US. 336, 337 (1965).
7 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3001,-04 (Supp. 1965).
8 S. 383, Ohio General Assembly, § 2 (1965) provides:
This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. The reason
for such necessity lies in the fact that habeas corpus petition proceedings
alleging violation of constitutional rights have increased in the courts to
such an extent that a new procedure appears to be the best method of
protecting onstitutional rights of individuals and, at the same time, provid-
ing a more orderly method of hearing such matters. Therefore, this Act shall
go into immediate effect.
9 Omo REv. CoDE Am. § 2953.21 (Page Supp. 1967).
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Nebraska law, was to provide the best method of protecting the
constitutional rights of individuals and at the same time set out a
more orderly method of hearing such matters, substituting it for the
present habeas corpus procedure. In Freeman v. Maxwell the Ohio
Supreme Court restricted habeas corpus relief to persons challenging
the legality of confinement before conviction, persons challenging
the jurisdiction of the court and persons challenging their confine-
ment on grounds unrelated to the conviction itself.10 This halted
the flood of habeas corpus petitions in the Supreme Court and made
the Ohio Post-Conviction Remedy Act the exclusive method for
asserting constitutional claims by collateral attack.
The Post-Conviction Act in Ohio was basically designed to per-
mit a person to attack his criminal conviction on constitutional
grounds. Under the statute, as originally enacted and as amended, a
petition is filed in the original trial court and that court decides
whether substantive grounds for relief exist. If none are found the
petition is dismissed. If there are substantive grounds for relief then
a hearing is held and the Court then decides whether the conviction
is void or voidable. The functioning of the new Act in comparison
with the original statute can be examined under four headings: (1)
who can file under the Post-Conviction Remedy Act; (2) what pro-
cedures are involved; (3) what are the judicial standards and bases
for decision; and (4) what claims can be raised.
I. WHO CAN FILE
The original post-conviction act required that a person had to
be in custody under sentence in order to file a petition. This creates
problems for a person serving a sentence for a conviction stemming
from a proceeding other than the one he wishes to challenge. He is
forced, for no rational reason, to wait to assert his claims until he
begins to serve the challenged sentence. It also creates a problem for
persons on probation or parole. Ohio Courts have held that a person
on parole cannot file a post-conviction petition because he is not
"in custody."" The new Act avoids these problems by making any
person convicted of a criminal offense eligible to file. The Act also
takes notice of the possible changes in juvenile procedures fore-
10 Freeman v. MaxweU, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965). Se also Miller v.
Haskins, 12 Ohio Misc. 164, 230 N.E.2d 694 (C.P. 1967), McNary v. Green, 12 Ohio St.
2d 10, 230 N.E.2d 649 (1967).
11 Gregory v. State, 11 Ohio App. 2d 107, 228 N.E2d 878 (1967); Laugcscn V.
State, 11 Ohio Misc. 10, 227 N.E.2d 663 (C.P. 1967).
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shadowed by In re Gaultl by allowing persons adjudged delinquent
to file petitions.
II. PROCEDURE
The new Act made some important changes in procedure pri-
marily designed to insure that there is a prompt adjudication of the
claims raised by petitioner. The Act specifically outlines the duty
of the clerk. He is to docket the petition upon receipt and bring it
promptly to the attention of the court. The original Act instructed
the court to grant a prompt hearing; but this general instruction did
not prove effective. A clerk of courts, when questioned about his
procedure upon his receipt of a post-conviction petition, said that he
held the petition undocketed until the petitioner sent a letter asking
what was being done. Delays of six months to a year and a half were
not uncommon. The Ohio Supreme Court had dealt with this prob-
lem under the original Act only to the extent of holding that a one
year delay did not qualify as prompt."' Hopefully, specific procedures
for the clerk will alert him to the importance of prompt and con-
scientious handling of petitions.
The clerk is also required to forward a copy of the petition to
the prosecuting attorney. Under the original Act notice was served
on the prosecuting attorney only when the court decided that a
hearing was necessary. The service on the prosecutor and the require-
ment that he respond within ten days will help to speed up con-
sideration of the petition and to identify the issues which the peti-
tioner has presented. Clarification will result because the court will
have the benefit of a prompt investigation of the claims by the
prosecutor which will be made available in his demurrer, answer, or
motion and possible supporting memoranda. This is especially im-
portant when the petition has been prepared by a prisoner and the
issues are not clearly articulated. The right to move for summary
judgment within twenty days after issues are made will also help
prevent long delays. Petitioner will be aided in his attack by the
provision which makes appointed counsel for the petitioner and on
appeal for indigent petitioners mandatory under the new Act when
the petition is "sufficient on its face." 14 Whether counsel was to be
appointed was discretionary under the original Act.
Contrary to the procedure under the original Act, the new
12 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13 State ex Yel. Turpin v. Court of Common Pleas, 8 Ohio St. 2d 1, 220 N.E2d 670
(1966).
14 Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2953.24(A) (Page Supp. 1967).
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statute seems to grant an absolute right to the petitioner to be
present at the hearing, thus removing the matter from the discretion
of the court.15
Appeal procedure has been changed from civil to criminal. 10
The time for filing an appeal has thus been lengthened from
twenty to thirty days and the use of delayed appeal is allowed.
III. JUDICIAL STANDARDS AND BASES FOR DECISION
Under the original statute a petitioner was entitled to a hearing
unless the petition, files, and records of the case showed that he was
not entitled to relief. What the judge could consider in deciding
whether to grant relief,17 the burden petitioner had to meet to
receive a hearing18 and the extent to which judges had to explain
15 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.22 (Page Supp. 1967). See State v. Lawson, 12 Ohio
St. 2d 9, 230 N.E2d 650 (1967).
16 OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. § 2953.23(B) (Page Supp. 1967). See Henderson v. State, 11
Ohio App. 2d 1, 227 N.E.2d 814 (1967), for a discussion of the appeal process under the
original act.
17 State v. Lloyd, 8 Ohio App. 2d 155, 156-57, 220 N.E.2d 840, 842 (1966):
In our opinion, the files and records referred to by the statute are those of
the original criminal action being attacked by the petition to vacate. The
documents which are of record in a felony case would generally be the
bindover order, the indictment or information, motions, verdict and court
entries. It could include a transcript of testimony and proceedings....
State v. Mattox, 8 Ohio App. 65, 67, 220 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1966):
The record shows that the judge recounted facts bearing on the issues, which
facts were not presented in evidence. In passing upon the truthfulness of
appellant's testimony, the court relied not upon the state's evidence alone,
but upon personal recollections of what had occurred before him at the crim.
inal trial.
18 State v. Vaughan, 7 Ohio App. 2d 154, 155, 219 N.E2d 211, 212 (1966) presented
a rather restrictive interpretation:
where must be some showing that the prisoner seeking relief because of a
denial of his constitutional rights has, in fact, suffered a denial of those
rights or, at least, some matters must appear that compel the trial judge
to call for a full disclosure of the things that did occur when the prisoner
was accused of participating in a crime.
State v. Williams, 8 Ohio App. 2d 135, 136, 220 N.E.2d 837, 838 (1966) took a more
liberal approach:
The petition alleges grounds for postconviction relief under Section
2953.21, Revised Code. The record of the original criminal proceedings does
not fully rebut the allegation. Accordingly, in our opinion, appellant was enti-
tled to an evidentiary hearing in which he would be provided an opportunity
to prove his allegations.
More recently in State v. Bryant, 15 Ohio St. 2d 62 (1968), the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated that:
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dismissal 19 created most of the litigation under the statute. The new
Act retains the same language but contains an explanation of what
the petitioner has to show (substantive ground for relief) and what
may constitute files and records. 21 In addition, the new Act requires
that findings of fact and conclusions of law be made whether a
hearing is held or not.2 2 This requirement will allow effective ap-
pellate review of all post-conviction proceedings, not just those in
which a hearing is held. It will also insure that the court has made
a conscientious investigation into petitioner's claims.
There is no reason to suppose that the right to file additional
documents or the right to amend the petition was not available. Any
possible doubt is removed by the language of the new Act. It
specifically provides that supporting affidavits and other documentary
evidence may be filed by petitioner.23 Petitioner may also amend his
petition before the prosecutor responds without leave of the court
and after the answer, demurrer, or motion with leave of the court. -2 4
This provides a better chance for petitioner to show that he does have
substantive grounds for relief.
One additional procedural requirement which created some
difficulty under the original Act was not, however, altered. The
petitioner still is required to file in the trial court where his original
conviction occurred. This is the best place for such an action to be
litigated;25 but some complications arise when the same judge who
In a case where an accused is not represented by counsel at the time he pleads
guilty and the record does not show whether the accused was advised of his
right to counsel ... it is incumbent on the court ... to conduct a hearing
on such questions ... . Id. at 63-64.
19 Jones v. State, 8 Ohio St. 2d 21, 222 N.E.2d 313 (1966).
The court noted that the trial court did not grant a hearing on the Petitioner's
claim that there was no effective waiver of counsel, dismissing the petition with the
usual statement: "Petition and motions of the defendant show to the satisfaction of
the court that the defendant is not entiled to relief." 8 Ohio St. 2d at 21.
The court felt that the claims of petitioner could not be answered on the files
and records alone. They directed the trial court to reexamine the claims and make
proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. This indicates that under the original
Act, finding of fact and conclusions of law were required only when a hearing was
held.
20 Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(E) (Page Supp. 1967).
21 Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(C) (Page Supp. 1967).
22 Ono REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(C), (E) (Page Supp. 1967).
23 OHiO Rav. CODE ANN. § 295321(C) (Page Supp. 1967).
24 OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2953.21(F) (Page Supp. 1967).
25 INsrrrurE oF JuD. ADmiN., STANDARDS RELATLNG To Posr-CoNvicrioN REmED s
§ 1.4(b) 8.. 30 (rentative Draft, 1967).
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presided at the conviction of the defendant presides at the post-
conviction hearing. In State v. Mattox20 the court ruled that a
decision based on the judge's personal recollection of events which
were not on the record and not placed in evidence was a denial
of rights of confrontation and cross-examination. It also resulted in
the loss of the right to an impartial tribunal. If the recollections of
the judge are to be used as evidence he may be sworn in as a witness
and another judge must conduct the hearing.
IV. WHAT CLAIMS CAN BE RAISED
The language explaining which claims can be raised under
the Post-Conviction Act was not changed. A petitioner is entitled to
relief if "there was such a denial or infringement of his rights as to
render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution
or the Constitution of the United States.' 27 A void judgment is one
in which the court lacked jurisdiction over either the person or the
subject matter.28 This judgment is also subject to challenge under
state habeas corpus2 and is rather unusual in criminal cases.
The critical problem in this area arises when the court tries to
decide which judgments are voidable. The legislature expressed the
intent that this statute was to provide the best method of protecting
the constitutional rights of the individual.80
It would seem that the best method of protecting a person's con-
stitutional rights would require that all substantive claims be given
one full hearing on the merits. But the Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Perry seems to throw a procedural roadblock in the path of
many substantial but unlitigated claims. In that case the court de-
cided that:
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of con-
viction bars the convicted defendant from raising and litigating
in any proceeding, except on appeal from that judgment, any
defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or
could have been raised by the defendant at the trial which re-
sulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that
judgment.8'
26 8 Ohio App. 2d 65, 220 N.E.2d 708 (1966).
27 OHIo Rxv. CoDE ANN. § 2953.21(A) (Page Supp. 1967).
28 State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 178, 226 N.E.2d 104. 107 (1967).
29 Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965).
SO S. 883, Ohio General Assembly, § 2 (1965), quoted supra note 8.
31 10 Ohio St. 2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104, 108 (1967). The Court in Perry gave
two examples of claims which would be recognizable under post-conviction. One was
discovery after the conviction of the factual basis for new claim. The other was where
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These claims, in the view of the court, had already been adjudicated
against petitioner.32
Faced with a conflict between two important policies, finality
of judgment and adequate litigation of constitutional claims, the
court favored finality. This has resulted in nearly complete emascula-
tion of the Post-Conviction Act.Ps
Other jurisdictions have faced this same conflict but have
solved it in a somewhat different manner. Oregon has specific
statutory language dealing with the problem of prior judgmen 3P
If there was no appeal, res judicata does not affect errors at the trial
level. After appellate review with counsel no post-conviction relief
is available unless the grounds were not and could not reasonably
have been raised. Illinois has developed its doctrine of res judicata
by case law. In People v. Dale the court set a broad limit on relief
available:
The remedy provided for under the act cannot be em-
ployed to obtain another hearing upon claims of denial of
constitutional rights as to which a fulf and final hearing on the
merits has already been had.35
Additionally People v. Jenning warned against any application of the
principle of finality which would prevent consideration of the merits
the petitioner did not have counsel or had not knowingly and willingly waived
counsel either in a guilty plea or at trial.
The fact that the right the petitioner is relying upon %as not yet dearly articu-
lated by the courts would seem to be an excuse for not raising the claim at trial;
but in State v. Johnson, 14 Ohio St. 2d 67, 236 N.E.d 552 (1968), the court refused to
reach the merits and dismissed the claim on the basis of Perry. Since the jurisdiction of
the courts under the post-conviction act is similar to their jurisdiction under the old
expanded habeas corpus, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will probably
remain claims which should be raised at trial or on appeal.
32 In Laugesen v. State, 11 Ohio Misc. 10, 227 N.E.2d 663 (C.P. 1967), decided just
one day before Perry, the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County decided a post-
conviction claim for relief. Judge J. V. Corrigan in a well-reasoned and wel.researched
opinion stated:
Common sense would seem to dictate that post conviction remedies exist to try
fundamental issues of constitutional guarantees that have not been tried before.
Ordinary principles of finality of judgments must apply to all questions which
have been completely litigated. Id. at 13, 227 NE2d at 666.
33 In Coley v. Alvis, 381 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1967) the court examined the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Per y and decided that since petitioner had a lawyer and
since all five of his claims could have been raised at the time of his guilty plea.
Ohio's post-conviction remedy did not have to be exhausted in order to meet federal
habeas corpus requirements.
34 OmE. R v. STAT. § 138.550(1), (2) (1967).
s5 406 M11. 238, 244, 92 N.E2d 761, 765 (1950).
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of the claim. But the court also stated that claims which were not
presented at trial when competent counsel was present are waived.80
The federal post-conviction remedy 7 has restricted res judicata
principles to those claims which have been previously considered and
determined on appeal,38 by habeas corpus"0 or at trial.40 The con-
cept of waiver is based on the definition in Johnson v. Zerbst: "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." 41
One concept common to these three jurisdictions is that res
judicata should not be a bar to a decision on the merits of the claim.
In Oregon and Illinois as well as in Ohio, however, there is not a
sufficient distinction between res judicata and waiver. The key to
the problem is to define waiver in a way which allows claims which
have not been decided on the merits to be heard in a post-conviction
hearing. If waiver can be so defined, not all the claims which could
have been raised but were not will be eliminated. A clearly-
articulated distinction between a waiver which constitutes a decision
on the merits and res judicata as to a claim never asserted could
revitalize post-conviction in Ohio.
The federal courts have evolved a concept of waiver which can
be applied to the state post-conviction actions. In Fay v. Noia the
Court stated that procedural defaults incurred by the applicant dur-
ing state court proceedings would not be an effective waiver of
federal rights in a habeas corpus action. Only a deliberate by-pass
of the orderly procedure of the state courts could act as a waiver.42
This same reasoning could be applied to restrict the meaning of
"could have been raised" in Perry to claims which were knowingly
and intentionally omitted. A finding that a knowing, intelligent
relinquishment of a right occurred is a decision on the merits that
the right was not violated. A waiver based on state law procedural
requirements does not reach the merits of the claim. 48 The basic
rationale of post-conviction proceeding is to give all claims a decision
36 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
87 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
88 Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862 (1st Cir. 1967).
89 Winhoven v. United States, 221 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1955).
40 Lampe v. United States, 288 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Earley v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 522 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
41 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
42 372 U. S. 891, 438 (1963).
43 INSTITUTE OF JUD. ADMIN. STANDARDS RELATING To POST-CONVICION REtMDiF
§ 6.1, 89 (Tentative Draft, 1967).
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on the merits. Waiver should be an affirmative defense to any claims
made by petitioner and the burden would be on the State to show
an intentional affirmative waiver. This would reopen Ohio post
conviction remedies to many of the claims which are ordinarily made
after conviction but are foreclosed by Perry.44
V. Ti POST-CONVICTION ACr IN FRANKLIN CouNTY, OHo
An investigation of the way a specific jurisdiction has reacted to
the Post-Conviction Act is necessary in ascertaining the statute's
actual impact on criminal procedure.
Franklin County has a large volume of criminal cases which give
rise to many post-conviction actions.45 The attitude of the judges
toward the post-conviction action and the practical problems which
the court and the prosecutor face are probably typical of the situa-
tion throughout the state.
In one transcript of a post-conviction hearing a judge expresses
attitudes which are not unreasonable or uncommon even though
they are put forth in a somewhat extreme manner.40 The judge is
44 For thirteen different grounds for relief which should be cognizable under a
post-conviction statute, see A Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 2 HARv. J. Lscis. 189.
90 (1965).
45 Over 1100 indictments were returned by the Grand Jury in 1967.
46 State v. Williams, Docket No. 37,224 (C.P. Franklin County April 6, 1967),
(Rev'd March 19, 1968).
THE CouRT: You didn't ask for counsel?
TnE Wn-Nm: Because I didn't have no money for counsel so I didn't
know I was entitled to one.
THE CouRT. The Judge asked you if you wanted an attorney?
THE WrrNrss: No, he didn't.
THE COURT: I was the Judge.
THE WrrNrss: Well.
THE CouRT: Do you remember me?
Tim WrrFmss: I can't say that I do remember.
THE COURT: I asked you if you had an Attorney.
THE Wrmss: No one asked me anything like that.
THE CouRT: Asked you how you plead. The Judge asked you if you
understood the charge, didn't he?
THE WnmEss: At that time I was in sort of like a daze, I don't remember
-hardiy remember anything.
TnE COURT: Do you remember about stealing this money from Mr.
Hawkins?
THE WrmS: I don't think that is relevant.
THE CoURT: It is very relevant. I asked you if you remember stealing
the money?
THE WrrNms: That doesn't have anything to do with what I am in here
1968]
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confronted by a man who claims that the judge failed to inform him
of his right to counsel and in effect railroaded him off to prison. The
judge knows what his usual procedure was and feels certain that the
THE CouRT: Well, you better answer the question.
THE WitNss: I don't think I have to answer that question.
THE CouRT: Then you are going back to the penitentiary awfully quick.
That is all.
MR. GLASCOR: If the Court pleases, I must insist that this man be given
his right to make the record. If the Court wants to overrule after the record
is made. The Court has asked me to come down and I am taking my time
to do this and I think it should be done in a proper fashion. He has a right,
as I understand it, your Honor, to make up a record in this Court and If the
Court wants to overrule we know what his next step is.
THE CouRT: I want him to tell the truth.
Ma. GLAscoR: The Prosecutor wants to cross-examine into what the
Court is asking him now, which I think it is proper to do, well and good, but I
think we should be given a full opportunity to make up our record.
Q. (By Mr. Glascor) Mr. Williams, were you afforded a lawyer on ar-
raignment?
A. No, I wasn't.
Q. Were you asked by anyone whether or not you wanted a lawyer?
A. No, I was not.
THE CouRT: Well, did you want a lawyer?
THE WiTNEss: I would have liked to have had one..
TaE CouRT: If I give you a new trial and try you again then this will
start all over again, do you understand that?
THE WrrNFss: If this is to be, your Honor, that has to be.
THE CouRT: Has to be.
THE WrrNEss: Then I will take my chances.
THE CouRT: For the purpose of the record, let the record show that I was
present at the arraignment of this Defendant, and I had him identify all of
them. I asked if he had the copy of the indictment, and I asked him If lie
understood the charge and he said he did. The charge was the taking of
$12,000.00 from a man by the name of Hawkins. And I asked him if he had
an attorney and he said, "No." I asked him if he needed an attorney and lie
said, "No." I asked him how he pled and he said he pled guilty and I sen-
tenced him. Anything further? ...
THE CouRT: As far as I am concerned I am trying to find out whether
substantial justice has been done. Now, do you think that you would like to
have a new trial or just want to get out?
THE WrrNEss: I really would like to get out. I would like to.
THE COURT: You wouldn't like to have a new trial, would you?
THE WrrNss: Well, if I had to have a new trial, your Honor, I would
have a new trial, I believe.
THE CouaT: You want me to bring Mr. Hawkins in here and tell me
about your stealing his money?
THE WrrNFss: You can.
THE COURT: I don't need to, you pled guilty and you are still guilty.
THE W'Nm.ss: Guilty or innocence is irrelevant.
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man must have been guilty for him to have accepted a guilty plea.
Unfortunately this personal knowledge cannot be used47 and the
judge feels frustrated by the lack of a written record of what he is
certain happened.
The fact that the question of guilt or innocence is not at issue
in this proceeding is disturbing to the judge's concept of substantive
justice. It is not unreasonable for him to believe that guilty men
should remain in jail when their only claim depends upon unsub-
stantiated testimony which the judge knows is untrue but cannot
rebut by the available evidence.
The judge is often confronted with another unsettling factor in
the failure of the petitioner to realize the consequences if he is
successful. There is the possibility that he may be retried and re-
convicted, thus losing credit for time served.48
Judges are frustrated in their attempts to effectuate the statute
by the number of frivolous and repetitive petitions which flood the
courts. Petitioners would do themselves a service by eschewing the
"shotgun" approach and limiting the petition to legitimate con-
THE COURT: Oh, no, it isn't. ...
THE COURT: Application for relief under the post-conviction law is
denied. Prisoner remanded to the penitentiary. May I say this is another
example of the damages that result from the foolish laws enacted by the
legislature encouraging everybody from the penitentiary to make a claim that
his rights are denied and come in and lie about it when the record disproves
them, and so absolutely, and the upper Courts never pay any attention to
whether the fellow is guilty or not. I think it's very important to know
whether they are guilty or not. This man is guilty, no question about it.
His rights were all accorded in my Court. Wasn't denied counsel at all.
47 State v. Mattox, 8 Ohio App. 2d 65, 220 N.E.2d 708 (1966).
48 In the recent case of McNary v. Green, 12 Ohio St. 2d 10, 230 N.E.2d 649 (1967)
the court allowed a prisoner to have the time served under a sentence which was
subsequently vacated credited to a prior existing sentence. The court stated that a
sentence which is vacated as invalid is invalid as of the time of imposition. Although
the court distinguished this situation from one in which a vacated conviction is
reimposed the principle that a prisoner has been deprived of his liberty and deserves
credit for time served should apply in either situation. The withholding of such
credit has a coercive effect on a prisoner with a valid constitutional claim. If he wishes
to present his claim he must risk wasting all his previous time served if he is succ=ul
with his constitutional claim but is reconvicted in the subsequent trial. See the fol-
lowing unreported cases for examples of cases where the prisoner was not given credit
for time served under a previous conviction which was reversed. State v. Walter E.
Jones, Nos. 76,725, 76,726, 76,727, 76,728, 76,761 (C.P. Ct. Hamilton County, October 21,
1967); State v. Duane Packer, No. 4332 (C.P. Ct. Marion County, July 27, 1962); State
v. Theodore Jackson, No. 34,996 (C.P. Ct. Franklin County, June 21, 1966). There do
not seem to be reported appellate cases supporting this practice and McNary v.
Green supra indicates a qualified disapproval of it.
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stitutional claims. Courts have a duty to consider all claims but a
constant exposure to unintelligible and irrelevant claims creates a
negative attitude toward post-conviction as a useful or necessary
remedy.
The things which disturb judges most about post-conviction are
inherent in the concept of collateral attack. But the courts themselves
can eliminate many frivolous claims by having a written record of all
judicial proceedings leading to conviction. The most prevalent
problem with post-conviction action in Franklin County arises from
a lack of a transcript of arraignment proceedings. It also arises, ac-
cording to Common Pleas Court Judge Leach, from the inability of
judges to prophesy what the Supreme Court would do in ten years.40
The problem is illustrated by the claim by petitioners that they were
not provided counsel, were not advised of their right to counsel and
did not knowingly and intelligently waive their right to counsel.
The Supreme Court in Carnley v. Cochran5" placed the burden on
the state to establish a waiver in the face of a silent record. This
ruling combined with the right to counsel guarantees of Gideon v.
Wainwright5l creates the presumption of a violation of petitioner's
right to counsel which the state must rebut. In states like Florida
where no right to counsel for indigents existed this burden on the
state is probably justified. In Ohio, however, there has been for many
years a statutory requirement that indigents who desire an attorney
could have one appointed. 2 The fact that Ohio courts had a statutory
duty to appoint counsel should have some weight. The Common
Pleas Judge argues that even if the court did ascertain whether or
not the defendant wanted a court-appointed attorney, they had no
reason to make sure that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver
to meet federal requirements because the right to counsel in state
trials had not yet been declared as a constitutional right.
The finding of facts and conclusions of law set out in the foot-
note outline the typical Common Pleas Court decision when faced
with this problem.53 It also provides a good example of an adequate
49 Personal Conversation with Judge Leach, Dec. 17, 1967.
50 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
51 372 U.S. 335 (1962).
52 OHIO REV. COME ANN. § 2941.50 (Page Supp. 1967).
53 Fletcher v. State, Docket No. 38,739 (C.P. Franklin County February 19, 1968):
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That defendant Keith Fletcher was indicated by Grand Jury of
Franklin County for the crimes of burglary (1 count), larceny (1 count),
forgery and uttering a forged check (4 counts) on December 12, 1960.
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compliance with the statutory requirement of findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
A prisoner with a constitutional claim related to his conviction
has three possible state remedies. These are habeas corpus, post-
conviction and delayed appeal. The usefulness of habeas corpus is
2. That on December 12, 1960, defendant Keith Fletcher appeared in
open court at arraignment and entered his plea of guilty to the six counts of
the indictment and was sentenced to the Ohio Penitentiary and to pay
costs, counts one and two to be served concurrently and counts three, four,
five and six to be served concurrently and consecutively with counts one and
two.
3. That there was no court reporter present at the hearing and no
transcript of the testimony of the proceedings was taken.
4. That files and records of the case are silent as to whether or not
defendant Keith Fletcher was represented by counsel at the time of his plea of
guilty.
5. That the files and records of the case are silent as to whether the Court
advised defendant of his constitutional rights, including his right to counsel,
his right to trial by jury and his right to have counsel appointed for him in
the event he could not afford counsel of his own.
6. That the fies and records of the case are silent as to whether there was
any waiver of the right to counsel by defendant Keith Fletcher.
7. That the unrebutted testimony of te defendant Keith Fletcher estab.
lishes that he was not represented by counsel at the time of his plea of guilty,
that he was without financial means to obtain counsel, that he was not ad-
vised of his constitutional rights to the appointment of counsel and that he
did not waive the right to counsel.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion guarantee the right to counsel to all persons accused of crime.
2. The failure of the trial court to appoint counsel for the defendant
in the absence of a waiver by the defendant of the right to counsel is a denial
and infringement of the rights of the defendant under the Ohio Constitution
and the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, this Court finds that the petition of the defendant, Keith
Fletcher, is well taken and that the judgment of conviction and the sentence
for these offenses be and it is hereby vacated and set aside and that the
defendant should be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Franklin County
and be granted a new trial on these charges.
Pursuant thereto it is therefore further ordered that Mr. E. B. Hasins,
Superintendent of the London Correctional Institution, release the body of the
defendant, Keith Fletcher to the custody of the Sheriff of Franklin County,
Ohio, to take and safely keep said Keith Fletcher in the Franklin County,
Ohio, jail under bond as prescribed by this Court until a new trial can be had
or until the defendant be further dealt with according to law.
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very limited and post-conviction is severely restricted by Perry.
Delayed appeal is available for all claims which Perry characterizes
as ones which should be raised at trial or on appeal. It is based on
the discretionary power of the court to grant an appeal even though
the request is not timely. The major considerations for the court are
whether the prisoner was diligent in seeking to perfect an appeal and
whether there was an attorney available after conviction. An indigent
prisoner who was diligent and did not have an attorney after con-
viction does not need to show probable error to overcome the pre-
sumption of regularity.54 This is not a satisfactory remedy in that
the court does not look to the merits of the claim. Appeal can be
denied even if a valid constitutional claim exists. 5
Prisoners can present their claims to the federal court only
after the available effective State court remedies have been ex-
hausted. Post-conviction does not have to be attempted if the claims
are excluded from consideration by Perry. But the prisoner must
attempt delayed appeal if he cannot use post-conviction. 0
The new Post-Conviction Act makes several constructive changes
in the Ohio procedure. Petitioners are now more likely to get a
prompt, adequate consideration of their claims and courts will have
a better understanding of what their function is.
Unfortunately the major problem as to what claims can be
raised was not dealt with by the Legislature. If Ohio does not
broaden its post-conviction action to handle most constitutional
claims it is forfeiting control over its own criminal process. Federal
courts apply the doctrine of exhaustion in habeas corpus in deference
to state procedure. Since Coley v. Alvis, however, the federal courts
have opened their doors to all the constitutional claims which seem
to be excluded by Perry. There is no requirement that the state
courts apply federal criteria for deciding whether or not to hear a
claim but if they do not they are depriving themselves of the oppor-
tunity to make their own determination of the issues in cases where
their criteria are less expansive than the federal criteria. This is not
federal intervention in state affairs as much as it is an abrogation of
responsibility by the state. Adoption of the federal concept of waiver
would be a step toward asserting state control over state criminal
process. John R. Thomas
54 State v. Webb, 11 Ohio St. 2d 60, 227 N.E.2d 625 (1967).
55 Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d 885 (1965).
56 Knox v. Maxwell, 277 F. Supp 593 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
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